1. These written comments are submitted by INTERIGHTS 2. This case concerns, inter alia, racial discrimination within the context of education for Roma children. It raises critical issues concerning the interpretation of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention") which fundamentally affect the extent to which the Convention provides meaningful protection against discrimination and the extent to which all persons and groups within the jurisdiction of the Convention are able to enjoy and exercise the substantive rights guaranteed therein. While this Court has well developed case law with respect to direct discrimination, it has not had the opportunity to develop as comprehensive an approach to indirect discrimination. For this reason these comments are limited to approaches to indirect discrimination, which is also pleaded in this application. As noted in our Original Comments, it is rarely possible to neatly categorise direct and indirect discrimination, and the Canadian Supreme Court has indeed rejected this distinction. However, regardless of the terminology or methodology adopted, it is critical that Article 14 of the Convention effectively protects against the substance of indirect discrimination. These comments focus on approaches to indirect discrimination and its proof before other international human rights bodies.
3. Indirect discrimination reflects systemic inequalities in societyechoing accepted societal stereotypes and commonly held prejudices. Because it is structural -in that a particular neutral policy or practice has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on a particular minority group -it is particularly difficult to prove. This makes its discriminatory impact no less real on its victims. 5. Three aspects of the Chamber judgment are particularly problematic in terms of indirect discrimination. First, the emphasis placed by the Chamber on the reasons for -that is the intention behind -the segregation of Roma children. 6 Second, the failure of the Chamber to attach appropriate significance to statistical data as evidence of indirect discrimination. 7 Third, the Court's rejection of consideration of the broader social context in which Roma children have been segregated. 8 The Grand Chamber's consideration of this application provides a pivotal opportunity for this Court to revise the Chamber's approach, to consolidate a purposive interpretation of Article 14, and to bring this Court's jurisprudence on indirect discrimination in line with existing international standards. 
B. CONTOURS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
6. 'Indirect discrimination' occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice places certain persons at a disadvantage compared with other persons. It is concerned with the impact that a policy or practice has on an individual or group. 9 The concept of indirect discrimination was first recognised by the Supreme Court in the USA in Griggs v. Duke Power 10 and has subsequently been widely incorporated by courts and legislatures internationally. 11 The parameters of indirect discrimination are outlined in our Original Comments at paragraphs 9-27.
7. Earlier this year, in Zarb Adami v. Malta, 12 this Court confirmed that discrimination is not always direct or explicit and that in certain cases a policy or general measure will have disproportionate, prejudicial effects on a group of people, even if it is not aimed or directed at a particular group and this may amount to indirect discrimination. 13 8. Similarly the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has recently confirmed that the principle of equal treatment prohibits not only overt discrimination but also all covert forms of discrimination. 14 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD Committee") last year defined indirect racial discrimination, as extending "beyond measures which are explicitly discriminatory, to encompass measures which are not discriminatory at face value but are discriminatory in fact and effect." 15 The UN Human Rights Committee has also endorsed this approach. 16 Intention to Discriminate 9. Critically -and in line with the approach of regional and national courts 17 -this Court has accepted that intent is not required in cases of indirect discrimination. 18 This needs to be distinguished from discrimination cases where intent is already an element of the underlying offence, such as in cases involving violent acts motivated by racial prejudice. 19 10. In the case of indirect discrimination, it is sufficient that the practice or policy results in a disproportionate adverse effect on a particular group. It is not necessary for the applicant to prove that the impugned measure was designed or applied with any discriminatory intent. 20
C. PROVING DISCRIMINATION
11. This Court has already acknowledged the complexity of proving discrimination cases. 21 Due to its subtle character, these difficulties of evidence are compounded in cases of indirect discrimination. For this reason, courts and legislatures are increasingly accommodating in the evidence they allow of indirect discrimination. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should similarly confirm a flexible approach, for victims to be able to secure effective protection. This does not, however, detract from the necessity of the Court having to scrutinise and weigh up the relevance of all evidence.
Burden of Proof
12. This Court has accepted that once an applicant has shown that there has been a difference of treatment, it is then for the respondent Government to show that the difference in treatment can be justified. 22 This Court has also accepted that if the onus does not 17 Courts have recognised that a lot of indirect discrimination is inadvertent and may be based on cultural or societal assumptions and may even have been adopted in good faith. other jurisdictions. As noted in our Original Comments, courts do not accept statistical evidence unhesitatingly, and must assess the credibility, strength and relevance of statistics to the case at hand, requiring that they be tied to the applicant's allegations in concrete ways. 41 The ECJ requires that courts take into account "whether they cover enough individuals, whether they illustrate purely fortuitous or short-term phenomena, and whether in general, they appear to be significant." 42 20. Where the credibility of statistics has been positively assessed, their significance needs to be given legal effect, most often through the shifting of the burden of proof. The weight given to statistics will depend upon the extent of disadvantage that they reveal. Where they reveal an overwhelming disparity, the statistics alone should amount to a prima facie case capable of shifting the burden of proof. 43 While yet to find a violation on this basis, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has accepted in principle that statistics alone might shift the burden of proof, provided that the statistical evidence is "sufficient." 44 21. It is respectfully submitted that the correct principle to apply is that statistical evidence is sufficient, without more being required for an applicant to establish a prima facie case of indirect discrimination requiring objective justification on the part of the respondent State. However, if this Court maintains the position that statistics alone are not sufficient to disclose a discriminatory practice, it is submitted that consideration of statistics in conjunction with credible evidence of the context of widespread societal discrimination should be sufficient to shift the burden of proof.
Consideration of the Context of Discrimination
22. The Chamber in this matter states that it is the Court's role to examine the individual applications before it, not to "assess the 41 The ECJ has stated that statistics should be "relevant and sufficient" -see Original Comments at § 32 including the references contained there. overall social context." 45 The interveners agree that it is the Court's role to adjudicate on violations against particular individuals -as expounded in an application to this Court -rather than to pronounce, for example, on the general situation of discrimination against Roma in the Czech Republic. However, when assessing the impact of apparently neutral measures on a particular minority, it is submitted that it is appropriate for this Court to be mindful of the broader context in which indirectly discriminatory practices and policies are adopted and are allowed to operate.
23. As outlined in our Original Comments, in evaluating disproportionate effect, it is common for courts to consider evidence of "a general picture" of disadvantage, or "common knowledge" of discrimination to establish a prima facie case. 46 In Switzerland, for example, courts are encouraged to look beyond the facts of the case at hand and to take account of knowledge of facts from general life. 47 In some cases this common knowledge evidence will be so persuasive that it alone will be sufficient to establish a prima facie case, in 
D. CONCLUSION
26. This case provides a critical opportunity for this Court to consolidate an approach to indirect discrimination that is elaborated in such a way so as to ensure that people are practically protected from the harmful effects of indirect discrimination by Article 14. In order to do so, this Court must acknowledge the inherent difficulties in proving indirect discrimination, and confirm a flexible approach to its proof. Many national and international bodies, and most significantly the European Community law, are moving towards a more liberal method of defining and proving indirect discrimination. This flexibility does not mean that claims of discrimination can be lightly brought or that courts do not retain a duty to carefully scrutinise evidence. It simply means that the possibilities for effective legal protection are extended with respect to this type of discrimination.
27. In the past this Court has indicated its adherence to "the principle of free assessment of all evidence." 53 Mindful of this, it is hoped that this Court will further develop its position on the use of statistical evidence. While not requiring the presentation of statistical evidence to prove indirect discrimination, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should leave open this possibility. Where credible statistics are overwhelming in the disproportionate effect they reveal, it is submitted that such statistical evidence alone should be capable of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and shifting the burden of proof to the respondent. In addition, the Court might consider that social context alongside any other evidential sources may be an indication of prima facie discrimination.
28. It has long been the position of this Court that the European Convention must provide practical and effective protection for human rights. 54 The broad language of Article 14 has allowed it to evolve over time, to respond to changes in the understanding of discrimination and to provide increasing protection against it. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should establish a flexible framework for protection under Article 14, that allows those most marginalised in society to use the law meaningfully to combat indirect discrimination and to ensure that they are able to access, exercise and enjoy the fundamental rights set out in the Convention to the same extent as others within its jurisdiction. 
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